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Abstract— In the restructured electricity industry, electricity
pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers pos-
sessing private information (private production cost function). We
focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is represented
by a non-strategic agent. We consider demand to be elastic.
We propose a market mechanism that has the following fea-
tures. (F1) It is individually rational. (F2) It is budget balanced.
(F3) It is price efficient, that is, at equilibrium the price of
electricity is equal to the marginal cost of production. (F4) The
energy production profile corresponding to every non-zero Nash
equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism is a solution
of the corresponding centralized problem where the objective is
the maximization of the sum of the producers’ and consumers’
utilities.
We identify some open problems associated with our approach
to electricity pooling markets.
Index Terms—Oligopolistic electricity pooling markets, elastic
demand, mechanism design, asymmetric information, strategic
behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
The electricity industry has been traditionally regulated
by government to run under a predetermined-price cost-
minimizing monopoly. In past decades, there has been world-
wide tendency toward restructuring the industry toward a
free competitive market [1]. By restructuring the industry, we
will have oligopoly instead of monopoly. There have been
different practices of electricity restructuring with California,
Pennsylvania-new jersey-Maryland (PJM), British and Aus-
tralian markets as some of the most prominent ones.
Electricity markets are the heart of the industry restructur-
ing. Electricity as a trading commodity has unique features [2].
In particular, network flows are interconnected through KVL
and KCL laws. So, trade of electricity between two nodes in
the network affects the flows in the other nodes . Moreover,
the flows are limited by physical capacity constraints of the
lines. These limits have put the possibility of free bilateral
trades in question and pooling markets have been proposed as a
solution [3]. In pooling markets, Independent System Operator
(ISO) is a non-profit making entity that coordinates the flow of
electricity in the network. ISO stands between consumers and
producers and runs the market. He collects all the bids from
the consumer and producer side and dispatches the electricity.
In general, there are three approaches to run pooling mar-
kets: Cournot, Bertrand and the supply function model [4].
The first approach is based on the Cournot model. Here, each
producer only bids his production amount. The consumers buy
all the production but at a price that is a function of the total
production. References [5], [6] and [7] adopt this model for
their studies and reference [8] provides a comprehensive study
of Cournot models in electricity markets. The British market
originally, and the Australian National Electricity Market lie
in this category [3].
The second approach is the Bertrand model. Here, every
producer has a predetermined amount of generation and bids
a price. The ISO then starts with the lowest price proposal and
clears the market.
The third and most popular model is the supply function
model ( [3], [9]). Here, each producer sends a complete
price-production curve to the ISO. This curve specifies the
amount of production at every price level. ISO then runs an
optimization to meet the demand with the lowest total cost.
US electricity markets including California [10], Pennsylvania
New Jersey Maryland (PJM) [11] and Midwest ISO (MISO)
[12] are examples of markets with price-production bids.
British market under reform is also in this category [3].
Reference [8] presents a comprehensive survey of the lit-
erature on Bertrand vs. supply function auctions. Both of
these markets are primarily based on multi-unit auctions where
more than one unit of the same type is auctioned [13]. Price-
wise, these auctions can be in two categories, namely, uniform
or discriminatory price auctions. Reference [4] presents a
comprehensive survey of the literature on uniform vs. discrim-
inatory price auctions. In a uniform price auction, all selected
suppliers are paid a uniform price, equal to the market clearing
price. In a discriminatory auction, the suppliers are selected in
a manner similar to the uniform auction, but are paid according
to their own bids instead of the market clearing price.
Even though studies have been performed to identify the
best auction format for electricity markets, conclusions as
to the efficiency of the auction formats are still unclear [4].
Because the analysis of electricity markets is very complex,
so far electricity market equilibrium models either do not
consider strategic bidding behavior or assume that players have
all relevant information about the other players’ characteristics
2and behavior [14]. There is no theoretical background (ana-
lytical investigation) on the efficiency and performance of the
currently proposed auctions.
The above discussion summarizes the state of the art in the
design of electricity pooling markets. There are several open
issues/problems associated with electricity pooling markets,
such as the presence of strategic players with asymmetric
information, inelasticity of demand in the market, the limits
imposed by the transmission network and dynamic markets
that run over a finite horizon. The study of electricity pooling
markets with strategic players possessing asymmetric infor-
mation for the case of elastic demand motivates the study
presented in this paper.
This paper is a the first of a series of two papers. The second
paper addresses electricity pooling markets where demand is
inelastic.
B. Contributions of the paper
In this report we focus on a static pooling market with strate-
gic producers possessing private information, non-strategic
(price-taking) elastic demand, and no transmission constraints.
We adopt Nash Equilibrium (NE) as a solution/equilibrium
concept. The interpretation of NE is the same as in [15]- [16].
We assume demand to be elastic. We propose a market
mechanism which has the following features. (F1) It is in-
dividually rational. That is, strategic producers voluntarily
participate in the pooling market. (F2) It is budget balanced.
That is, the mechanism does not create any budget surplus or
any budget deficit. (F3) It is price efficient. That is, the demand
is paying a price equal to the marginal cost of producing the
next one unit of energy. (F4) The energy production profile
corresponding to every non-zero NE of the game induced by
the mechanism is a solution of the corresponding centralized
problem, i.e. the problem the ISO would solve if it had
access to the producers’ private information. Furthermore, if
zero production is the only NE of the game induced by the
mechanism, the energy production profile corresponding to
that is a solution of the corresponding centralized optimization
problem.
The mechanisms/game forms presented in this report are
distinctly different from currently existing mechanisms for
electricity pooling markets. There are two key differences
between our mechanism and currently existing mechanisms.
1) In terms of the type of information exchange (the
message space of the mechanism)
2) In terms of the performance
We elaborate on these key differences.
(1) In the Cournot model, agents report the amount of
electricity they intend to supply to the pooling market. In
the Bertrand model, agents report the price they intend to
charge per unit of produced energy. In the supply function
model, each agent reports its price-production curve. In our
mechanism, each agent/producer reports the amount of energy
it intends to produce along with the price per unit of energy
it wishes to charge.
(2) In current studies, whenever performance analysis
is done, there is no comparison between the performance
achieved by the proposed market and the optimal centralized
performance. We propose a market model where agents are
strategic and possess private information. We present a com-
plete analysis of the market and prove that it possesses features
(F1)-(F4).
We also note that, in many electricity markets proposed so
far, strategic behavior or private information are not taken into
account. Even when strategic behavior is taken into account,
such as in supply-function models, strategic producers are
assumed to report their true price-production curve to the ISO.
In our opinion, this assumption is inconsistent with strategic
behavior.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as following. The model
of the market analyzed/studied in this paper is introduced
in Section II. The objective is presented in section III. The
centralized optimization problem associated with the model
of Section II and the objective of Section III is presented in
Section IV. The analysis of the problem with elastic demand
appears in V. Discussion of open problems associated with
our approach to electricity pooling markets appears in Section
VI. The proofs of our results are presented in Appendix A-
B. Examples illustrating our approach and results appear in
Appendix C.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a pooling market consisting of an ISO, N pro-
ducers, and consumers who are represented by their aggregate
demand. Let I = {1, 2, ..., N} denote the set of producers. We
make the following assumptions:
(A1) The number of of producers, N , is fixed and common
knowledge among the ISO, producers and consumers; further-
more, N > 3.
(A2) Producers are strategic and self-profit maximizers.
(A3) Each producer i has a fixed capacity xi > 0, i =
1, 2, ..., N , which is common knowledge among the producers
and the ISO.
(A4) The cost function Ci(.), i = 1, 2, ..., N , of energy
production is the producer i’s private information. Also,
Ci(.) ∈ Ci, where the function space Ci is common knowledge
among producers and the ISO.
(A5) The functions Ci(.), i = 1, 2, ..., N , are convex;
furthermore, for all i, i = 1, 2, ..., N ,
Ci(0) = 0, (1)
C
′
i(ei) > 0, (2)
C
′′
i (ei) > 0, (3)
for all ei > 0, where ei denotes the amount of energy produced
by producer i, and C ′i(.) and C
′′
i (.) denote the first and second
derivatives, respectively, of Ci(.).
(A6) Producer i’s utility function is
ui(ei, ti) = −Ci(ei) + ti (4)
where ti denotes the amount of money producer i receives for
the energy it produces.
3(A7) The demand is elastic. It consumes the whole produc-
tion.
(A8) The consumers’ utility when they consume d units of
energy is ud(d); ud(.) is common knowledge among the ISO,
producers and consumers.
(A9) The function ud(.) is concave with
ud(0) = 0 (5)
u
′
d(d) > 0 (6)
u
′′
d(d) < 0 (7)
for all d > 0, where u′d(.) and u
′′
d (.) denote the first and
second derivatives, respectively, of ud(.).
(A10) The consumers’ total utility is
ud(d) −
∑
i∈I
ti. (8)
where d is the total energy consumed and
∑
i∈I ti denotes
the amount of money demand pays to the producers for the
energy consumed.
(A11) The ISO is a social welfare maximizer. From (4) and
(8) the social welfare function for the elastic demand is
W1(e1, e2, ..., eN) = ud(
∑
i∈I
ei)−
∑
i∈I
ti −
∑
i∈I
Ci(ei)+
∑
i∈I
ti = ud(
∑
i∈I
ei)−
∑
i∈I
Ci(ei).
(A12) No transmission constraints are taken into account in
the energy distribution.
We now briefly discuss Assumptions (A1)-(A12).
Reference [5] argues that after restructuring, the market
will change from a monopoly to an oligopoly. Therefore, we
assume a finite N > 3 number of producers.
Strategic self-profit maximizing behavior of the producers,
(A2), is a mainstream assumption in industry restructuring.
(A3) is based on the assumption that no producer invests on
his generation capacity or retires any of his generation plants
during the market time.
(A4) is the basis of the producers’ strategic behavior. Cost
functions are private information because they are dependent
on variables which are not observable, including production
technology, plant management, failures and resource limits
[6]. The assumptions on each Ci(.), expressed in (1)-(3) are
standard in the literature (See [8] and papers referenced in it).
The producers’ utility functions, defined by (4) in (A6),
are quasilinear. They include a cost of Ci(ei) which is then
compensated by a payment ti from the consumers.
The demand is elastic and consumes all of the productions
(A7).
The strictly increasing and concave nature of ud(.), (A8), is
a common assumption on the utility of the demand side [17].
We assume ISO and producers have the same observation and
estimation of the demand utility function. Therefore, ud(.) is
common knowledge among the ISO and the producers.
Demand is required to pay a total of
∑
i∈I ti to the ISO to
be distributed among producers. Therefore, the total utility of
the consumers is as in (8).
(A7) and (A10) imply that the demand is non-strategic.
Demand does not bid in the market and does not decide on its
amount of production and its payment. Reference [18] has the
same assumption in the pooling market and argues that it is
consistent with most currently operating and proposed power
auctions.
Considering the form of the producers’ utilities as well
as the consumers’ utility, the non-profitmaker ISO aims to
maximize the social welfare defined in Eq. (9).
In this current model, transmission constraints are not taken
into account (A12). Reference [18] adopts same assumption
for pooling markets and discusses that it is consistent with
the UK system , the California power exchange, the Victoria
pool and other systems around the world where transmission
constraints and congestion management are handled outside
the power auction. Transmission constraints have not been
taken into account in other works that have also focused on
the market side of electricity markets (See [5], [8] and the
papers referenced therein).
III. OBJECTIVE AND METHOD OF APPROACH
The ISO’s objective is to maximize the social welfare
function given by Eq. (9) under the constraints imposed
by (A1)-(A12) along with the requirement that the capacity
constraints of the producers are satisfied.
To achieve this objective, we proceed as follows. We first
consider the centralized optimization problem the ISO would
solve if he had perfect knowledge of the cost functions, Ci(.),
i = 1, 2, ..., N . The solution of this centralized problem would
give the best possible performance the ISO can achieve.
Afterwards, we design a mechanism/game form that pos-
sesses properties (F1)-(F4). The above properties are obtained
via the creation of a tax function which incentivizes each
strategic producer to align his own individual objective with
the social welfare. The specification and interpretation of the
mechanism and its tax function appears in Section V.
IV. THE CENTRALIZED PROBLEM
By Eq. (9), the ISO’s centralized problem is
max
ei,i∈I
ud(
∑
i∈I
ei)−
∑
i∈I
Ci(ei)
s.t. 0 ≤ ei ≤ xi. (9)
We call the above problem MAX1.
Assumptions (A3), (A5) and (A9) imply that in MAX1, the
objective function is strictly concave and the set of feasible so-
lutions is non-empty, convex and compact. Therefore, MAX1
has a unique solution, and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality. The
KKT conditions are useful for the analysis of the mechanism
proposed in this paper. That is why they are presented in
Appendix A.
V. THE MECHANISM FOR ELASTIC DEMAND
We first specify the mechanism, then we interpret its el-
ements, mainly the tax function, and, finally, we study the
properties of the mechanism. We illustrate the mechanism via
two examples that appear in Appendix C.
4A. Specification of the Mechanism
A game form/mechanism is described by (M, h), where M
is the message/strategy space and h :M→A is the function
from message space to the space A of allocations.
We consider the following mechanism.
Message space Let M be
M := (M1 ⊗M2 ⊗ ...⊗MN), (10)
where Mi is producer i’s message space,
Mi := [0, xi]× R+, i ∈ I (11)
and mi ∈Mi is of the form
mi = (eˆi, pi) (12)
where eˆi denotes the amount of energy producer i proposes
to produce, and pi denotes the price producer i proposes per
unit of energy. Note that eˆi is restricted by 0 ≤ eˆi ≤ xi and
pi is restricted by pi ≥ 0.
Allocation Space Let A be
A := (A1 ⊗A2 ⊗ ...⊗AN ), (13)
where Ai is producer i’s allocation space
Ai := [0, xi]× R, i ∈ I, (14)
and ai ∈ Ai is of the form
ai = (ei, ti), (15)
where ei denotes the amount of energy producer i is scheduled
to produce, and ti denotes the tax (respectively subsidy)
producer i should pay (respectively receive).
Outcome function h :M→A
For each m := (m1,m2, ...,mN ) ∈M we have
h(m) = (e, t) = (e1, ..., eN , t1, ..., tN ), (16)
where
ei = eˆi (17)
ti = pi+1ei − (pi − pi+1)2 − p2i+1ζ2 + φi (18)
ζ = |D(p)−
∑
i∈I
ei| (19)
p =
∑
i∈I pi
N
(20)
D(p) = (u
′
d)
−1
(p) (21)
φi = (pi+1 − pi+2)2 (22)
pN+1 := p1. (23)
We proceed to interpret and analyze the properties of the
proposed mechanism.
B. Interpretation of the Mechanism
Since the designer of the mechanism, i.e. ISO, can not alter
the producers’ cost functions, Ci(.), i = 1, 2, ..., N , even if he
knew their functional form, the only way it can achieve his
objective is through the use of appropriate tax incentives/tax
functions. The tax incentive of our mechanism for produce i
consists of three components, that is,
ti = ti,1 + ti,2 + ti,3, (24)
where
ti,1 = pi+1ei (25)
ti,2 = −(pi − pi+1)2 − p2i+1ζ2 (26)
ti,3 = φi. (27)
The term ti,1 specifies the amount user i receives for its
production ei from the demand side. It is important to note
that the price per unit of electricity energy that a producer is
paid is determined by the message/proposal of other producers.
Thus, a user does not control the price per unit of electricity
it provides.
The term ti,2 provides the following incentives to the pro-
ducers: (1) To bid/propose the same price per unit of produced
energy (2) To collectively propose a total electricity supply
that meets the optimal demand at the proposed price. The
incentive provided to all users to bid the same price per unit of
produced energy is described by the term (pi− pi+1)2, which
is a positive punishment paid by producer i for deviating from
the price proposal of producer i + 1. The incentive provided
to all producers to collectively propose a total production that
meets the optimal demand is captured by the term p2i+1ζ2.Note
that D(p) is the optimal demand for price p, because it solves
the optimization problem below:
D(p) = argmax
d≥0
u(d)− pd. (28)
ti,2 can be thought of as the tax payments the ISO collects
from the producers in order to align their productions with the
social welfare maximizing production profiles.
The goal of ti,3 is to lead to a balanced budget of payments
by the producers to the ISO. After collecting
∑
i∈I ti,2 of tax
from producers, ISO distributes ti,3 among them in order to
achieve budget balance, that is,∑
i∈I
[ti,2 + ti,3] = 0. (29)
Note that, ti,3 is not controlled by producer i’s messages, so
ti,3 does not affect producer i’s strategic behavior.
C. Properties of the Mechanism
The properties possessed by the proposed mechanism are
described by Theorems (V.1)-(V.7) and lemma (V.1). The proof
of all these properties are presented in Appendix B.
Theorem V.1. (Existence of NE) One of the NE of the game
induced by the proposed mechanism is m∗i = (0, 0), for all
i ∈ I . The corresponding production profile and taxes at this
equilibrium are zero.
5Definition V.1. We call the NE where for all i ∈ I , m∗i =
(0, 0) a trivial Nash Equilibrium. We call any other NE of the
game induced by the proposed mechanism a non-trivial NE.
Theorem V.2. (FEASIBILITY) If m∗ = (eˆ∗, p∗) =
(eˆ∗1, eˆ
∗
2, ..., eˆ
∗
N , p
∗
1, p
∗
2, ..., p
∗
N ) is a non-trivial NE point of the
game induced by the proposed mechanism, then the allocation
e∗ is a feasible solution of problem MAX1, i.e.
D(p)|m∗ −
∑
i∈I
e∗i = 0, (30)
ζ∗ = 0. (31)
lemma V.1. Let m∗ be a non-trivial NE. Then for every
producer i ∈ I we have,
p∗i = p
∗
i+1 = p
∗ (32)
p∗ = u
′
(
∑
i∈I
e∗i ) (33)
t∗i = p
∗e∗i (34)
∂ti
∂ei
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= p∗. (35)
Theorem V.3. Consider a solution e∗ = (e∗1, e∗2, ..., e∗N ) of
the centralized problem MAX1. There exists a NE, m∗ =
(eˆ∗1, eˆ
∗
2, ..., eˆ
∗
N , p
∗
1, p
∗
2, ..., p
∗
N ) of the game induced by the
mechanism such that the production profile corresponding to
m∗ is equal to e∗.
Theorem V.4. (i) Consider any non-trivial NE m∗ of the game
induced by the mechanism. Then, the production profile e∗
corresponding to m∗ is an optimal solution of the centralized
problem MAX1. (ii) If trivial NE is the only NE of the game
induced by the mechanism, then the zero production profile
corresponding to that is the optimal solution of the centralized
problem MAX1.
Theorem V.5. (INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY) The proposed
game form is individually rational, that is at every NE of the
game induced by the mechanism, the corresponding allocation
(e∗, t∗) is weakly preferred by all users to the initial allocation
(0, 0).
Theorems (V.3), (V.4) and (V.5) show the game induced by
the mechanism has a set of NE including all the solutions to
the centralized problem plus a trivial NE of all zero prices and
all zero productions. The trivial NE is Pareto dominated by any
other NE of the game. Note that for high cost of production,
the centralized problem may have only corner solutions of
e∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ I . Then this corner solution corresponds to
the trivial NE outcome of the game, which is the unique NE
in this case.
Theorem V.6. (BUDGET BALANCE) The mechanism is bud-
get balanced both at equilibrium and off equilibrium, that is
the payments from all producer and consumers sum up to zero.
Theorem V.7. (PRICE EFFICIENCY) The mechanism is price
efficient; that is at equilibrium, the demand is paying a price
equal to the marginal utility of the next one unit of production.
The result of Theorem (V.7) shows that the game induced
by the proposed mechanism incentivizes the producers to
reveal the true marginal cost of production of the system at
equilibrium.
VI. CONCLUSION AND REFLECTIONS
Electricity restructuring has changed the industry from
a monopoly into an oligopoly where energy producers are
strategic players with private information and market power.
In this new environment, electricity can be traded through
bilateral contracts or pooling markets. In this paper we focused
on pooling markets with strategic producers possessing private
information, non-strategic consumers with elastic demand, and
no transmission constraints. We designed a mechanism which
has properties (F1)-(F4). Achieving these features all together
distinguishes our mechanism from any other market design
available in the literature. In the games induced by the pro-
posed mechanism, the only NE besides the one that results in a
production profile equal to the centralized solution is the trivial
one which is Pareto dominated by the centralized solution NE.
It is worth noting that price efficiency is achieved even though
customers (represented by their aggregate demand) are not
strategic.
The game form presented in this paper ensures that the
desired allocations are achieved at equilibria without spec-
ifying how an equilibrium is reached. That is, this game
form/mechanism does not include an iterative process that
determines how the NE of the game induced by the mechanism
are computed by the users. The lack of such iterative processes
for decentralized resource allocation problems where strategic
users possess private information is a major open problem
in mechanism design. The major difficulty in constructing
iterative algorithms that guarantee convergence to NE is the
following. Consider an algorithm/iterative process for a de-
centralized allocation problem where strategic users possess
private information. At each stage of the algorithm, each user
updates its message. After an update, a user, say user i, can
report any message it deems beneficial to itself, and other users
may not be able to check whether or not user i is following the
rules of the algorithm. Consequently, the construction of the
iterative process must provide incentives to the users to follow
the rules at each stage of the algorithm. Such a provision of
incentives must be based, in general, on all the information
available at the current stage and must, in general, take the
whole future into account. Algorithms with the above features
are currently unavailable [15].
Future problems along this line of research include the con-
sideration of inelasticity for demand, transmission constraints,
and dynamic games for a number of markets over a time
horizon.
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6APPENDIX A
THE KARUSH-KUHN-TACKER CONDITION FOR
PROBLEM MAX1
The Lagrangian for MAX1 is
LMAX1 = ud(
∑
i∈I
ei)−
∑
i∈I
Ci(ei)
+
∑
i∈I
µi(xi − ei) +
∑
i∈I
νiei, (36)
and KKT conditions are, ∀i ∈ I ,
∂ud(
∑
i∈I ei)
∂ei
∣∣∣∣
e∗
− ∂Ci
∂ei
∣∣∣∣
e∗
− µ∗i + ν∗i = 0, (37)
µ∗i (xi − e∗i ) = 0, (38)
ν∗i e
∗
i = 0, ν
∗
i ≥ 0, µ∗i ≥ 0. (39)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREMS (V.1)-(V.7) AND OF LEMMA (V.1)
Proof of Theorem V.1 Consider producer i and let m∗j =
(0, 0) ∀j 6= i. The first order conditions of producer i’s best
responses are
∂ui
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
−i
= −2(pi − p∗i+1) = −2pi
∂ui
∂ei
|m∗
−i
= −C ′i(ei) + pi+1 − p2i+1
∂ζ2
∂ei
∣∣∣∣
m∗
−i
= −C ′i(ei).
Considering Eqs (1)-(2) and solving for first order conditions,
we have p∗i = 0, e∗i = 0. As a result, no producer has the
incentive to deviate from (0, 0) and therefore, m∗ = {m∗i =
(0, 0), ∀i ∈ I} is a NE For this set of messages, Eq. (17), (18)
and (22) result that e∗ = 0 and t∗i = 0.
Proof of Theorem V.2 Since φi does not depend on
producer i’s message
∂φi
∂pi
=
∂φi
∂ei
= 0. (40)
Consider two cases.
Case 1: For all i ∈ I , p∗i > 0.
Here, p∗i ≥ 0 is not binding. Therefore, at NE, for all i ∈ I ,
∂ui
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
=
∂ti
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= −2(p∗i −p∗i+1)−2p∗i+12ζ∗
∂ζ
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= 0.
Summing up over all i ∈ I we get:∑
i∈I
∂ti
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= −
∑
i∈I
[2(p∗i − p∗i+1) + 2p∗i+12ζ∗
∂ζ
∂pi
|m∗ ]
= −2(
∑
i∈I
p∗i+1
2)ζ∗
∂ζ
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= 0. (41)
In addition,
∂ζ
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
=
∂ζ
∂pj
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= sign(D(p)−
∑
i∈I
e∗i )
D
′
(p)
N
; (42)
furthermore, from Eq. (21),
D
′
(p) =
−1
u′′d(
∑
i∈I e
∗
i )
. (43)
Eqs. (7), (41), (42) and (43) imply that ζ∗ = 0 or [D(p)|m∗ −∑
i∈I e
∗
i ] = 0.
Case 2: There exists i ∈ I s.t. p∗i = 0.
We prove that in this case we have a trivial NE.
Since pi ≥ 0 is binding at NE, we have
∂ui
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
≤ 0. (44)
Furthermore,
∂ui
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
=
∂ti
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= −2(p∗i − p∗i+1)− 2p∗i+12ζ∗
∂ζ
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= 2p∗i+1 − 2p∗i+12ζ∗
∂ζ
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
. (45)
Now assume p∗i+1 > 0. Then, from (42), (44) and (45)
ζ∗
∂ζ
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= ζ∗
∂ζ
∂pj
∣∣∣∣
m∗
> 0. (46)
Also, since pi+1 ≥ 0 is not binding,
∂ti+1
∂pi+1
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= −2(p∗i+1 − p∗i+2)− 2p∗i+12ζ∗
∂ζ
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= 0. (47)
From (46) and (47) it follows that
p∗i+2 = p
∗
i+1 + p
∗
i+1
2ζ∗
∂ζ
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
> 0. (48)
Following the same argument, we obtain
p∗i = p
∗
i+1 + (
∑
j∈I,j 6=i
p∗j+1
2)ζ∗
∂ζ
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
> 0. (49)
This contradicts the assumption of p∗i = 0. As a result, we
should have p∗i+1 = 0. Repeating the above argument we
obtain p∗j = 0, ∀j ∈ I .
Next, we show that e∗i = 0 is the best response of producer
i to any m−i = {mj = (ej , 0), ∀j 6= i}. We consider first
order conditions for producer i’s best response.
∂ui
∂ei
∣∣∣∣
m
∗
−i
= −C ′(ei) + p∗i+1 − [2p∗i+12|F (0)− ei −
∑
j∈I,j 6=i
e∗j |
×sign(F (0)− ei −
∑
j∈I,j 6=i
e∗j )] = −C
′
(ei). (50)
From (2), this derivative is always negative; hence, e∗i =
0, ∀i ∈ I . The result is a set of trivial NE of all zero prices
and zero products.
Proof of Lemma V.1 Since for all i ∈ I , p∗i > 0, using Eq.
(31) in Eq. (41) we obtain
∂ti
∂pi
|m∗ = −2(p∗i − p∗i+1) = 0. (51)
Therefore,
p∗i = p
∗
i+1 = p ∗ ∀i ∈ I. (52)
p∗ = u
′
(
∑
i∈I e
∗
i ) is a direct consequence of ζ∗ = 0 and
(52). And one immediate consequence of Eqs (22) and (52) is
φ∗i = 0 ∀i ∈ I. (53)
7Finally, Eqs. (18), (30), (31), (52) and (53) imply t∗i = p∗e∗i ,
and because ζ∗ = 0,
∂ti
∂ei
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= p∗ − 2p∗2ζ∗ ∂ζ
∂ei
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= p∗. (54)
Proof of Theorem V.3 We consider two cases.
Case 1: Interior solution (e∗i > 0 for some i ∈ I). Set,
∀i ∈ I ,
p∗i =u
′
d(
∑
i∈I
e∗i ), µˆ
∗
i = µ
∗
i ,
νˆ∗i =ν
∗
i , θˆ
∗
i = 0.
Eqs. (37)-(39) show that Eqs. (57)-(60) are satisfied under the
above selection.
Case 2: Corner solution (e∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ I). Set, ∀i ∈ I ,
p∗i = 0, µˆ
∗
i = µ
∗
i = 0,
νˆ∗i = −
∂Ci
∂ei
∣∣∣∣
ei=0
, θˆ∗i = 0.
Eqs. (37)-(39) show that Eqs. (57)-(60) are satisfied under the
above selection for corner solution.
Proof of Theorem V.4 (i) Let m∗ = (eˆ∗, p∗) =
(eˆ∗1, ..., eˆ
∗
N , p
∗
1, ..., p
∗
N) be a NE of the game induced by the
proposed mechanism. Then, (eˆ∗i , p∗i ) is a solution to producer
i’s profit maximization problem, that is,
(eˆ∗i , p
∗
i ) = argmax
eˆi,pi
−Ci(eˆi) + ti
s.t. 0 ≤ eˆi ≤ xi
pi ≥ 0. (55)
Call this problem MAX2. The Lagrangian for this problem is
LMAX2 = −Ci(eˆi) + ti + µˆi(xi − eˆi)
+ νˆieˆi + θˆipi (56)
and the corresponding KKT conditions are
− ∂Ci
∂eˆi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
+
∂ti
∂eˆi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
− µˆ∗i + νˆ∗i = 0, (57)
∂ti
∂pi
|m∗ − θˆ∗i = 0, (58)
µˆ∗i (eˆ
∗
i − xi) = 0, νˆ∗i eˆ∗i = 0, θˆ∗i p∗i = 0, (59)
νˆ∗i ≥ 0, µˆ∗i ≥ 0, , θˆ∗i ≥ 0. (60)
To show that the allocations e∗i = eˆ∗i , i ∈ I , corresponding
to m∗ are solutions of the centralized problem MAX1, we
construct the KKT parameters of the centralized problem
based on the producers’ profit maximization KKT parameters
as µ∗i = µˆ
∗
i , ν
∗
i = νˆ
∗
i ∀i ∈ I .
Then, Eqs. (57)-(60) along with lemma V.1 show that Eqs.
(37)-(39) are satisfied. Consequently, eˆ∗, is a solution of the
centralized problem MAX1. The assertion of Theorem (V.4)
follows since m∗ is an arbitrary NE of the game induced by
the mechanism.
(ii) From Theorem (V.3), if there is only a unique NE,
it should be corresponding to the unique solution of the
centralized problem MAX1.
Proof of Theorem V.5 Consider 3 cases.
Case 1: e∗i = 0. Then Eq. (34) results in
ui(e
∗, t∗) = −Ci(e∗i )− t∗i = −Ci(0)− p∗i × 0 = 0. (61)
Therefore, the NE outcome is weakly preferred to the initial
allocation.
Case 2: 0 < e∗i < xi. The constraint in Eq. (55) is not
binding and therefore the corresponding µˆ∗i and νˆ∗i are 0. Then,
Eqs. (34), (35) and (57) along with µˆ∗i = νˆ∗i = 0 result in
ui(e
∗, t∗) = −Ci(e∗i ) + t∗i = −Ci(e∗i ) + C
′
i(e
∗
i )e
∗
i . (62)
Furthermore, from (1)-(3), for the convex and increasing
function Ci,
Ci(ei) < C
′
i(ei)ei for any ei > 0. (63)
Combining (62) and (63) we get,
ui(e
∗, t∗) = −Ci(e∗i ) + C
′
i(e
∗
i )e
∗
i > 0. (64)
Case 3: e∗i = xi. Since the constraint ei ≤ xi is binding,
µˆ∗i > 0, νˆ
∗
i = 0, and Eqs. (1), (2), (35) and (57) imply
p∗ =
∂ti
∂ei
= C
′
i(e
∗
i ) + µˆ
∗ > C
′
i(e
∗
i ). (65)
Inequality (65) along with (34) and (63) result in
ui(e
∗, t∗)− Ci(e∗i ) + t∗i =
− Ci(e∗i ) + p∗e∗i > −Ci(e∗i ) + C
′
i(e
∗
i )e
∗
i > 0.
Proof of Theorem V.6 Producer i receives ti and demand
pays
∑
i∈I ti. Therefore, the sum of all payments adds up to
zero at every message proposal.
Proof of Theorem V.7 First consider non-trivial NE with
producer i ∈ I for which the production capacity constraints
are not binding, i.e. 0 < e∗i < xi. Therefore, µˆ∗i = νˆ∗i = 0
in Eq. (57). This along with Eq. (17) and (35) imply that
p∗ = ∂Ci
∂ei
∣∣∣
e∗
i
. Next, consider the case of zero production. Here,
by Theorem (V.1), demand pays tax equal to zero for zero
production. Therefore, the trivial price can be set equal to the
marginal cost of production.
APPENDIX C
EXAMPLES OF ELECTRICITY POOLING MARKET WITH
ELASTIC DEMAND
Here, we provide two examples of electricity pooling mar-
kets. At equilibrium, the first one results in positive production
and the second one results in zero production.
As we proposed in Section VI, we currently don’t have
an algorithm for computing the NE of the game induced
by the mechanism. Nevertheless, we have proven that the
production profiles corresponding to all non-trivial NE of the
game induced by the mechanism are optimal solutions of the
corresponding centralized problems. Thus, we obtain these
production profiles as the solution of the centralized problem.
Example C.1. This example illustrates the case where the
game induced by the mechanism proposed in Section V has
a non-trivial NE and the production profile corresponding to
this NE is positive.
8Consider a network of four producers with following cost
functions and capacities
C1(e1) = 2e1 + e
2
1 C2(e2) = 3e2 + e
3
2
C3(e3) = 4e3 + e
4
3 C4(e4) = 5e4 + e
2
4
x1 = x2 = x3 = x4 = 2.
The demand is elastic with utility function
ud(d) = 40
√
d. (66)
The social welfare function, Eq. (9) is
W (e1, e2, ..., e4, d) = ud(d)−
∑
i=1,2,...,4
Ci(ei) =
40
√
d− [2e1 + e21 + 3e2 + e32 + 4e3 + e43 + 5e4 + e24]. (67)
and the corresponding problem MAX1 is
max
ei,i∈I
40
√∑
i∈I
ei − [2e1 + e21 + 3e2 + e32 + 4e3 + e43 + 5e4 + e24]
s.t. 0 ≤ ei ≤ xi
The optimal production profile is
e∗1 = 2 e
∗
2 = 1.5 e
∗
3 = 1.1 e
∗
4 = 0
The market game in this problem follows from mechanism
(M, h) of Section (V) with these specifications. Message space
is Mi := [0, 2] × R+, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} where mi ∈ Mi is of
the form mi = (eˆi, pi). Allocation Space is A := (A1⊗A2⊗
A3 ⊗ A4), where Ai := [0, 2] × R, i ∈ I, is producer i’s
allocation space. And finally, outcome function, h :M→A,
for each m := (m1,m2,m3,m4) ∈ M is defined by Eqs (17)-
(23). Note that here, p =
∑
i∈I
pi
4
and D(p) = (u′d)
−1
(p) =
p2/1600.
This game has a non-trivial NE of the form eˆ∗i = e∗i , p∗i =
p∗, where p∗ will be the marginal cost of production. By Eqs
(33) and (34) the price and the tax payments at equilibrium
will be the following.
p∗ =
∂C2
∂e2
∣∣∣∣
e∗
=
∂C3
∂e3
∣∣∣∣
e∗
= 9.35$/MWH
t∗1 = 18.7 t
∗
2 = 13.6 t
∗
3 = 10.3 t
∗
4 = 0
From Eqs. (4) and (8), the utility of producers and the
demand at equilibrium is the following.
u1 = 10.7, u2 = 6.2, u3 = 4.45, u4 = 0, ud −
∑
i∈I
ti = 43.2
Since all the producers utilities are positive, the game is
individually rational. Price efficiency and budget balance are
also satisfied.
Note that the game induced by the mechanism has also a
trivial NE which is m∗i = (0, 0) for all i ∈ I . At this no-trade
situation, the utility of all producers as well as the demand
will be zero; therefore, it is Pareto dominated by the non-trivial
NE.
Example C.2. This example illustrates the case where the
game induced by the mechanism proposed in Section V has
only a trivial NE and the production profile corresponding to
this NE is all 0.
Consider the same network as in Example (C.1). Assume
the demand is elastic with the following utility function:
ud(d) =
{
100− (d− 10)2 0 ≤ d ≤ 10
100 otherwise
Replacing ud in social welfare maximization, Eq. (9), results in
the optimal production of 0. The game induced by the mecha-
nism designed for elastic demand has only one equilibrium
with m∗i = (0, 0), ∀i ∈ I . This is a trivial equilibrium.
Theorem (V.1) shows that the equilibrium price and the tax
payments are all zero. Form Eqs. (4) and (8), the utility of
producers and the demand at equilibrium is also zero. Also,
the mechanism is individually rational and budget balanced.
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